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ABSTRACT
Predicting election outcomes is of considerable interest to candi-
dates, political scientists, and the public at large. We propose the
use of Web browsing history as a new indicator of candidate pref-
erence among the electorate, one that has potential to overcome
a number of the drawbacks of election polls. However, there are
a number of challenges that must be overcome to effectively use
Web browsing for assessing candidate preference—including the
lack of suitable ground truth data and the heterogeneity of user
populations in time and space. We address these challenges, and
show that the resulting methods can shed considerable light on the
dynamics of voters’ candidate preferences in ways that are difficult
to achieve using polls.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Understanding the candidate preference of voters leading up to
a major election such as the 2016 U.S. presidential election is an
important but difficult task. Polls are widely used, but have sig-
nificant drawbacks; among other issues, a poll requires multiple
days to complete, and hence cannot give insight into the short-term
dynamics of vote choice, especially on a per-state level. Further, poll
results are confounded by interviewer effects, question wording,
and non-responsive or non-forthcoming subjects.
In light of the challenges presented by traditional polling, in this
paper we undertake an exploration of an alternative approach for
assessing candidate preference in the electorate. Our study exam-
ines the issues and potential benefits of approaching this problem
by using passively collected records of user activity on the Web. In
particular, we undertake the first study to look at the relationship
between Web browsing behavior and election candidate preference.
Our contributions are twofold: first, we elucidate the challenges
involved in using browsing behavior to assess candidate preference
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and we present methods that can be used to overcome those chal-
lenges. Second, we show that using Web browsing behavior, it is
possible to predict candidate preference with accuracy equivalent
to state of the art polling, but with the additional advantage that pre-
diction can be made on a fine-grain both spatially and temporally
(i.e., at a state level on a day-to-day basis). State-level prediction is
particularly important in the U.S. due to the winner-take-all nature
of the electoral college system at the state level.
Our study is based on a large corpus of Web browsing behavior
collected from participants who have opted-in to a major media
measurement company (comScore, Inc.). These users are essen-
tially analogous to Nielson families or participants in tracking polls.
The dataset captures the browsing history of more than 100,000
people in the U.S. over a 56 day period just prior to the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. Our high-level approach is to train a set of
specially-designed classifiers at the start of the prediction period
and then apply the classifiers on a day-by-day and state-by-state
basis to assess fine-grained shifts in candidate preference over the
remainder of the prediction period.
We show how to overcome the wide set of challenges inherent in
applying this approach to browsing data. First, we address feature
selection and show which aspects of Web browsing are most infor-
mative for prediction of candidate preference. Second, we address
the challenge of learning a model for individual user behavior given
that training labels on a per-user basis are not available. Rather, the
best training data available consists of polling done at the per-state
or per-county level. Third, we address the problem of making pre-
dictions on a state level, since training per-state models requires
subdividing data, with a large subsequent loss of training accuracy.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the amount of data
per state varies tremendously due to both population density differ-
ences and geographical state sizes. Finally, we address the challenge
of varying population composition as a function of day of the week.
It is well known that user activity on the Web varies qualitatively
based on day of the week. In order to make accurate predictions
on a day to day basis, this effect must be corrected. For each of the
above challenges, we clarify the nature of the problem and present
new solutions.
Having overcome the above challenges, we then demonstrate the
utility of the resulting method. We show that election results can be
predicted on a per-state level with accuracy comparable to state of
the art polling (with linear correlation of 0.94), and that the impact
of an exogenous event (the release of the infamous ‘Comey letter’
on October 28, 2016) can be assessed for its impact on candidate
preference on a fine-grained (day to day and state by state) basis.
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2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Public Opinion Research Methods
Predicting elections requires insights into the citizenry’s future
behaviors, which in turn depend on understanding its political
attitudes and preferences. Surveys, or polls, have become the most
important and prevalent method of gauging public opinion and
behaviors since their emergence in the 1930s. In a recent review of
public opinion surveys, Berinsky [3] notes early observations of
the power of polls in the minds of both the public and elites [10, 47],
but also the inherent difficulty of the task [4, 15, 22, 30].
Indeed, in the last 75 years, researchers have come to understand
the strengths and weaknesses of surveys, as well as the myriad
of considerations necessary to properly use these instruments to
understand political attitudes. Weisberg [48] summarizes the po-
tential for error in surveys. Sources of errors include response
accuracy (interviewer effects [e.g., 18, 49], question wording [see
also 21], questionnaire issues [e.g., 11, 32, 39, 42, 46], and question
nonresponse [e.g., 44]), respondent selection (unit nonresponse
[e.g., 1, 14], sampling frames and error [e.g., 31, 35]), and survey
administration (data editing, sensitive topics, and comparability
effects).
Acknowledging the immense contribution of survey research to
our understanding of political behavior and opinion, the vast poten-
tial for error suggests the possibility that other methods may shed
additional insights. Indeed, other approaches are not uncommon in
political science, including interpreting the partisan press, letters to
newspapers, as well as public speeches and protests [see 22]. More
recently political analysts have turned to the internet and social
media, in particular, in search of correlates of public opinion and
behavior. Related to our findings on the important role of social
media sites, Fourney et al. [12] find that this is primarily where
fake news stories were seen, and that aggregate voting patterns at
both the state and county levels are strongly correlated with fake
news site visits. Likewise, O’Connor et al. [37] note correlations
between Twitter sentiment and public opinion polls during the 2008
presidential election, while Tumasjan et al. [45] find sentiments
correspond to the parties’ and politicians’ political positions in a
German federal election.
2.2 Election 2016 Forecasting
The difficulty of the election forecasting task in 2016 provides partic-
ular motivation for our methods. Election forecasting made waves
in 2016 for the common perception that the polls got it wrong. In-
deed, both the mean of the 10 election polls culled by Real Clear
Politics on the day before the election as well as the “Polls-Plus”
model forecasts on the 538 website suggested a Clinton victory
with fairly high confidence. Notably, however, they were off in the
popular vote only by a small margin, about .7% [5]. To be sure, other
sites that rely heavily on daily updating of polls, such as the Times’s
Upshot and Huffington Post, as well as betting markets like PredictIt,
generally held Clinton as the probable winner. By contrast, political
science forecasting models primarily, but not exclusively, predict
the popular vote.1 The models of the popular vote based on politi-
cal science fundamentals, like presidential approval, pre-campaign
1For a more thorough engagement with forecasting in 2016 see the collec-
tion of articles in the PS: Political Science & Politics “Symposium: Forecasting
polls, incumbency, direction of the country, and the state of the
economy did very well. Campbell et al. [5] notes that of the ten
models seven missed Clinton’s vote share by one percentage point
or less and three missed it by less than half of a percentage point.
While what went wrong with the polls close to the election and
poll aggregation models are still active areas of research, it should
be clear that predicting electoral college outcomes is extremely
challenging, not least because these are rare events with fluctuating
voter turnout, and in close elections depend heavily on tight mar-
gins in a dozen or so battleground states.2 This fact underscores the
need to produce accurate predictions on a per-state basis, not just at
the popular vote level. Given the limitations of polling as described
here and evidenced in the 2016 election, it is clear that additional
information sources and methods may be helpful in addressing this
challenge.
2.3 Machine Learning in the Study of Politics
Grimmer [19] notes that social scientists have primarily usedmachine-
learning for characterizing and interpreting data, as opposed to
using it for prediction. In particular, social scientists have used
machine learning techniques to understand the latent qualities of
text [e.g., 6, 20, 26, 40]. However, supervised methods are gaining
in popularity. The discipline’s focus on estimating complex causal
effects has led to applications here [e.g., 23, 24]. Moreover, these
techiniques are making inroads to political predictions as well. For
example, Kennedy et al. [29] develop prediction models for more
than 500 elections across 86 countries based on polling data. Of par-
ticular relevance to our work, Kaufman et al. [27] use AdaBoosted
decision trees to predict Supreme Court decisions, as well as the
Democratic Party’s county-level vote share from census data on
age, income, education, and gender. Montgomery and Olivella [36]
apply related methods to U.S. elections to predict campaigns’ deci-
sions to go negative, and to estimate the attitudes and behaviors
of demographic subgroups. Ultimately, they foresee decision tree
models as being most useful for analyzing complex data generating
processes where the goal is prediction (rather than theory testing).
2.4 Analyzing Social Media and Networks
Surveys during the 2016 campaign showed that 27% of respondents
found either social media or news websites to be the most use-
ful way to get election information [17]. Accordingly, there has
been substantial work using data from social media (Twitter and
Facebook) to assess and predict political opinions, sentiments, and
preferences [2, 7, 9, 16, 33, 38, 43, 45]. When supervised learning is
employed, ground truth labels are obtained from small subsets of
users who self-declare (e.g., [38]), or from small sets of manually-
labelled users (e.g., [9, 16]).3
These studies contrast with ours in a number of ways. As we de-
scribe in Section 4.2, our method does not require per-user ground-
truth labels, and so can make use of much larger training sets.
Second, due to the nature of social media, previous methods gener-
ally focus on textual, linguistic, sentiment, and network analysis; a
the 2016 American National Elections” https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/
ps-political-science-and-politics/issue/4A42B1C2814C474155929789CCBAD7D5.
2For a review of the history of election forecasting see Lewis-Beck [34].
3We note that there is some evidence that reported accuracies of such methods are
overstated [7].
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Figure 1: Demographics of User Population Studied
number of studies have outlined the weaknesses of these methods
for predicting electoral outcomes [13, 25]. In contrast, we show
how to use knowledge of Web sites visited to make predictions,
which opens up a potentially simpler and larger body of data for
analysis.
In summary, our methodological approach has a number of
strengths. Foremost, perhaps, it relies on actual behavior, sidestep-
ping the potential response accuracy problems that come with
asking respondents to interpret questions or recall their own behav-
iors. Moreover, contrary to the complexity of inferring sentiment
from text on social media, blogs, or the likes, our approach looks
at sites visited, a straightforward and simple behavior, but one we
find to be extremely informative. We overcome the challenge of
obtaining per-user ground truth by developing a learning approach
that can use polling data for training. Finally, while our sample may
not be perfectly generalizable to the electorate, it is big, thereby
providing substantial demographic and geographic heterogeneity,
allowing predictions to be made on a fine grain both spatially and
temporally.
3 DATA
Our study is based on Web browsing data provided by comScore’s
global desktop user panel.4 The comScore panel is comprised of
of over 2 million residential users who are compensated for their
participation. When a user registers to participate in the panel,
they voluntarily provide their home address along with basic demo-
graphic information such as age, sex and income. Upon completion
of registration, they download and install monitoring software that
is active whenever they browse the Web. The software captures a
variety of data about their browsing activity including the URLs
transmitted in Web requests. We note that panelist privacy and
security are paramount concerns for comScore; details are at [8].
The data that we use in this study consists of all Web browsing
activity of US comScore panelists over a 56-day period from Sep-
tember 9, 2016 to November 3, 2016. Table 1 provides an overview
of the corpus, after the data reduction described below.
4comScore is a global media measurement company – www.comscore.com.
The demographics of our user population are shown in Figure 1.
We note that it is not necessary for the demographics of the user
population to precisely match the demographics of the underlying
populations, since we are training per-state models that compen-
sate for variations in user population composition across states (as
discussed in Section 4.3). However, the figure shows the extreme
imbalance in population sizes across states, which presents one of
the key challenges to our approach (and which we show how to
address in Section 4).
Total unique panelists ∼120 k
Total unique URLs ∼70 M
Total unique sites ∼380 k
Avg. URLs (non unique) visited per day per user ∼140
Table 1: Overview of the Web browsing data that is the ba-
sis for our study. The data was provided by US participants
in comScore’s global desktop user panel and was collected
from September 9, 2016 to November 3, 2016.
Data reduction. The total size of the data corpus was approx-
imately 1.6 TB in compressed form. Data reduction and feature
extraction were performed using Apache Hadoop on a 19-node
cluster.
While the panel data includes full URLs for data requested by
panelists, we discard the portion of the URL to the right of the
site’s domain name. Our initial explorations indicated that more
detailed portions of URLs did not provide enough signal in general
to improve our estimates. However, as described in Section 4.1, we
found other features such as HTTP referral headers to be important.
We also removed ads, by filtering out URLs matching those in
easylist.to, and mapped the time (originally UTC) of each request
to the local time of the correspondent panelist.
4 METHODS
In this section we describe the four main challenges to be overcome
in applying our approach, and the new approaches we developed
to address them.
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4.1 Feature Selection
Our first challenge is to extract a set of features that effectively
captures user preference from the user browsing logs described in
Section 3. We considered two sets of features: Web domains visited,
and HTTP referral information. For each user in the dataset, on
each given day, we created four feature vectors, each of which was
normalized to unit sum:
Alexa. The frequency with which the user visited each one of
the top 500 sites in the US, according to Alexa.5 We consid-
ered this our baseline feature vector.
Social Media. The frequency with which each user visited
sites when referred by social media sites (facebook.com
and twitter.com). Only visits to the top 100 most visited
sites (from social media sites) according to our dataset were
considered.
Search Engine. As for Social Media, but considering refer-
rals from large search engines (google.com and bing.com).
Only visits to the top 100 sites referred from search engines
were considered.
None. Similar to the last two, but considering only sites with-
out any referral information. Also for top 100 sites.
We conducted experiments in order to decide which of these vec-
tors were more appropriate to our problem. We combined the base
feature vector, Alexa, with the other 3 individually. In initial experi-
ments (similar to the ones in Section 5.2), we observed significant
improvements when combining the Alexa with the Social Media
vector. We also observed that no significant improvements were
reached when augmenting the Alexa vector with Search Engine or
None.
We conclude that, in general, people’s Web browsing behavior
when referred from social media sites is a better indication of their
candidate preference than sites visited from search engines or sites
visited by directly typing URLs on the browser. Hence, in the re-
mainder of this work, feature vectors representing users have size
600, with the first 500 components holding the distribution of visits
to the top 500 sites in the US, and the last 100 components reflecting
the distribution of visits to sites referred by social media. These
feature vectors are computed each day for each user having activity
on that day.
4.2 Learning without Individual Labels
The most significant challenge to overcome to use supervised learn-
ing for political preference is that at the individual level, labels (i.e.,
candidate preference) are generally not known. As described in
Section 2, previous work has been limited to very small training
set sizes due to the need to obtained self- or manually-labeled user
preferences.
In contrast, we start from the observation that what is in general
available is polling data – the fraction of voters from a given region
(e.g, city, county, state, and country) that prefer a given candidate
at a given point in time. Such data can be interpreted as providing
knowledge that some number of users has a particular label, without
identifying which users have that label.
5https://aws.amazon.com/alexa-top-sites/
Algorithm 1: EM-training
Data: U, R, B, A
1 L′ ← InitLabels(U , R, B)
2 repeat
3 L′′ ← L′
4 Θ← train A on (U, L′)
5 foreach region r do
6 tr ← percentile (1 − B (r )) of P (L(u) = 1|Θ), ∀u ∈ r
7 foreach row u do
8 L′(u) =
1, If P (L(u) = 1|Θ) ≥ tR (u )0, otherwise
9 until L′ ≈ L′′;
10 return Θ
We therefore consider the problem of starting from known
polling measurements at a specific time, and predicting individ-
ual user preference forward from that point (with fine resolution in
time and space). To address this we design an algorithm motivated
by the general expectation maximization (EM) principle. At a high
level, we adopt a data augmentation strategy of assigning a putative
label to each user. In the E-step, we assign each user a label, giving
out labels in proportion to observed polling data. In the M-step, we
estimate parameters of our classifier, resulting in a new ranking
of users with respect to label probability. The resulting algorithm
jointly learns both putative user labels and also a user classifier,
given regional statistics and user features.
To make our approach concrete, we first present basic definitions
and our EM-training algorithm in a general setting. Then, we show
how we instantiate our algorithm to solve our problem. At the end
of this section, we also describe a simpler approach that we use as
a baseline for comparison.
Our EM-training algorithm uses the following definitions:
- U: data matrix having users as rows and features as columns;
- R (u): region to which user u belongs to;
- L(u): true label of user u (unknown);
- L′(u): inferred label of user u, according to model parame-
terized by Θ;
- B (r ): known fraction of users in region r having label 1;
- P (L(u) = 1|Θ): estimated probability that user u has label 1,
according to model parameterized by Θ;
- A: learning algorithm yielding Θ that predicts P (L(u) =
1|Θ).
Our goal then is, given U, R, B and A, to obtain a model Θ that
maximizes ∑
u
1[L′ (u )=L(u )] −
∑
u
1[L′ (u ),L(u )] (1)
where 1[.] is the indicator function. In other words, we aim at
obtaining a model that can accurately predict L, even though it is
unknown.
Our method is shown in Algorithm 1. It starts by obtaining
an initial label assignment L′ in line 1. The goal this step is to
have labels that allow A to start the learning process in the right
direction; we discuss the function InitLabels later. Next, there is
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Figure 2: No single threshold can correctly predict the fraction of users preferring democratic in each state.
Algorithm 2: InitLabels
Data: U, R, B
1 foreach row u do
2 L′(u) =
1, If B (R (u)) ≥ 0.50, otherwise
3 return L′
an iterative process that: i) uses the current label assignment to
train a new, and improved, model; ii) uses the new model in order
to obtain a better label assignment. The process is repeated until
the current and new label assignments are approximately the same
(e.g., by changing less than 1%).
The M-step is described in line 4 and it consists basically of
training A on matrix U and labels L′. The two loops between
lines 5 and 8 are the E-step, responsible for creating the new label
assignment. The idea is to take advantage of the fact that we know
that each region r has a fraction B (r ) of users with label 1. To that
end, we assign label 1 to the users with highest probability of having
label 1. That is, we assign label 1 to all users in region r that are
above the 1 − B (r ) percentile of the P (L(u) = 1|Θ) values. During
the execution of the main loop of the algorithm, in each region
r only a fraction B (r ) of users has label 1. Our hypothesis is that
upon convergence, these users are in fact the mostly likely ones to
have such label.
A key part of Algorithm 1 is the label initialization (line 1). The
challenge in initialization is that there is no information about
which users within a region are more or less likely to have label 1.
Therefore, if wewant to distribute the such label to a fraction B (r ) of
the users in region r , we cannot do it better than in a random fashion.
To overcome this problem, our strategy, presented on Algorithm 2,
uses the idea of assigning label 1 to all users of a region for which
B (r ) ≥ 0.5 and label 0 to all users of regions with B (r ) < 0.5. Two
advantages arise from considering this simple initialization. First,
it eliminates adding any randomness to the algorithm, avoiding
different output models for different runs with the same input.
Second, the value of Equation 1, our desired objective function, is
higher with this initialization than it is using the random approach.
In order to observe such fact, consider a region r with n users. Then,
it is possible to show that the expected value of Equation 1 under
the random approach is n(2B (r )−1)2. Also, it can be shown that the
same value, when using Algorithm 2, is n(2B (r ) − 1) if B (r ) ≥ 0.5
andn(1−2B (r )) when B (r ) < 0.5, which is larger thann(2B (r )−1)2
in the (0, 1) interval.
To instantiate this algorithm, in this paper we created the matrix
Uwith rows representing users in the comScore dataset and features
as described in Section 4.1; for the set of regions we used the US
states (plus DC), totalling 51 regions; for the the function B, we
used state-level polls from the 538 site as reported on September
10, 2016;6 and as learning algorithm A we used logistic regression.
Finally, we also fix label 1 to mean a preference for Hilary Clinton
(or for Democratic) and 0 to mean a preference for Donald Trump
(or for Republican).
4.3 Population Heterogeneity: Spatial
Our thirdmethodological challenge concerns the spatial heterogene-
ity of user populations. Diving up users into state-level populations,
we find that there are significant differences in the relationship
between user (browsing) behavior and candidate preference across
different populations.
One straightforward approach to address this problem is simply
to train individual state-level models using Algorithm 1. However
this means that each model has much less data to use for train-
ing, leading to greater variance. This problem is made much worse
by the the extreme imbalance between state-level populations. As
shown in Figure 1, there are order of magnitude differences be-
tween the sizes of state level populations in our data. As a result,
there is simply not enough data in many states to estimate the 500
parameters of our logistic regression model.
However, we find that there is enough state-level data in each
case to estimate one additional model parameter. Combined with
the fact that using logistic regression as a classifier requires setting
a classification threshold, this gives us a natural way to combine
the strength of our nationwide population for training most model
parameters, with state-level polls for setting one state-level classifi-
cation threshold.
The need for state-level models can be seen in Figure 2. This
figure shows how setting the classification threshold affects the
6https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/
KDD’18, August 2018, London, UK Comarela et. al.
9/9 9/23 10/7 10/21 11/3
day
9/9
9/23
10/7
10/21
11/3
d
ay
0.00
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.32
0.40
0.48
0.56
0.64
0.72
Ja
cc
ar
d
 d
is
ta
n
ce
Figure 3: Changes in the set of users. Color represents the
Jaccard distance between sets of users for all possible pairs
of days.
predictions of our logistic regression model in each state. Colors
correspond to the fraction of users that would predicted to have
Democratic preference, as a function of the given classification
threshold (using data from September 10, 2016). The plus symbol
in each column is the learned threshold for best predicting the 538
polling data in that state on September 10.
The figure shows how variable the relationship between brows-
ing behavior and preference is. The correct threshold varies con-
siderably across states. This means that browsing behavior that
our model would consider to be to a given degree ‘Democratic’ in
one state could be considered much less (or more) ‘Democratic’ in
another state. Our hybrid approach of having 51 models, each using
500 shared, nationwide parameters and one state-level parameter,
addresses this problem while allowing us to make maximal use of
data for training.
4.4 Population Heterogeneity: Temporal
The final challenge we need to overcome concerns population vari-
ation over time. Not all users are active on each day. To assess the
effects of population changes over time, we proceed as follows.
First, for each day, we compute the set of users active in that day.
Next, for all pairs of days, we compute the Jaccard distance between
the corresponding sets of users.
The results are shown in Figure 3. Two effects are present. First,
we note changes on a long time-scale (weeks or more) that happen
due to new users joining or leaving the comScore panel. This effect
is relatively weak and we find that it does not affect prediction
accuracy to a significant degree.
The more significant effect is a weekly pattern, where the sets of
users on weekdays are similar, sets of users on weekends are similar,
and there is a large difference between weekday and weekend users.
This trend is probably due to the different habits that people have
during week days (mostly working days) and weekends. Interest-
ingly, we find that models trained on weekday users tend to predict
that weekend users have greater preference for the Democratic
candidate than they really do. Hence we adopt a simple clustering
strategy, in which we partition all our data into two (weekday and
weekend) sets, and train and predict on the two sets separately.
9/9
Fri
11/3
Thu
Training days
9/10 to 9/15
538 Poll
9/10
Comey Event
10/28
Week 1 Week 2 Week 7 Week 8
Test days
10/31 to 11/3
Figure 4: Dataset timeline. Highlighting: data retained for
training the model and for predictions; day of poll data; and
date of exogenous event (i.e., Comey letter).
5 RESULTS
In this section we show the performance of our method in practice.
We start by presenting how we split our data in order to avoid over-
fitting (in Section 5.1). In Section 5.2, we discuss how the learning
algorithms presented in Section 4 and how our state-level predic-
tions compare to polls and actual election results. Finally, in Section
5.3 we show the impact of exogenous events on user’s browsing
behavior, by focusing on a case study, i.e., the Comey letter an-
nouncement on October 28.
5.1 Putting it All Together
Figure 4 shows how we divided the dataset for purposes of train-
ing and testing. We retained data from the first week for training.
We used data from September 10 and 11 for the weekend model,
and from September 12 to 15 for the week model. For testing, i.e.,
correlating with election results, we used the four last days of the
dataset (i.e., from October 31 to November 3). Also for the purpose
of training the model, we used 538 polls from September 10, both
for estimating B (r ) (fraction of Hilary supporters in each state) and
tuning the per-state logistic regression thresholds.
In the Figure, we also point to October 28, i.e., the date of the
Comey letter announcement, which is analyzed on Section 5.3. In
this context, we used the model trained with data from the first
week to predict the support to the candidates in the remaining
7 weeks. Weekend and week days predictions were performed
using the correspondent models. Moreover, we define the time after
(inclusive) October 28 as after Comey, and from September 16 to
October 27 as before Comey.
5.2 Prediction Accuracy
In this section we demonstrate the methods presented in Section
4 and assess the results. Since users’ true labels are not known,
we cannot analyze the models in terms of accuracy, precision, or
recall. Hence, we use instead the correlation between our state-level
predictions and the actual election results.7
Figure 5 shows the contribution of the various aspects of our
method. The left hand plot shows our ‘baseline’ model, which only
trains a single logistic regression model and uses statewide major-
ity to label users. The center plot shows the improvement due to
7Note that in all the results we report, we exclude from consideration all polling and
election results for candidates other than Clinton and Trump, meaning that percentages
for the two principal candidates always sum to 100%.
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Figure 5: Fraction of support for democratic. Left: baseline model (ρ = 0.80); Center: baseline plus threshold refinement (ρ =
0.91); Right: baseline plus EM plus threshold refinement (ρ = 0.94).
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Figure 6: Fraction of support for democratic. Left: Election results vs. 538 on September 10; Center: Election results vs. 538 on
November 7; Right: Election results vs. our final predictions.
using 51 state-level models; the baseline model is adjusted to set
thresholds on a per-state basis, leading to an improvement of 0.11
in linear correation. Finally, the right hand plot shows the improve-
ment due to incorporating our EM-training algorithm, leading to an
additional improvement of 0.03 in linear correlation. These results
confirm the importance of state-level models and the utility of our
EM-training approach.
To study predictions in detail, we look at the battleground states,
which we define here as states in which the final vote tally was
between 45% and 55% for Clinton. Figure 6 compares our models’
predictions against the polls as reported by the 538 site. On the left
of the figure we show comparison of the vote with the polls as of
September 10; in the center we show comparison to the polls as
of November 7; and on the right we show comparison with our
models’ predictions.
Overall the browsing based models show more absolute error
compared to the reference values (the final vote on November 11)
than do the polls. However, the figures show that the polls tended
to generally overpredict the fraction of votes for Clinton, while
the browser-based models make predictions that are more equally
balanced between over-prediction and under-prediction for Clinton.
In fact the mean prediction error over the battleground states for
our models is 0.005, while for the polls it is 0.018 (September 10)
and 0.012 (November 7). This translates to a more accurate predic-
tion of the state-level outcomes (and hence the national election).
Specifically on September 10, polls predicted incorrect outcomes
on 7 states (MI, PA, WI, FL, NC, OH, and IA); on November 7, polls
were wrong on 5 states (MI, PA, WI, FL, and NC); while our models’
estimates are wrong on only 3 states (VA, NH, and WI).
These results suggest that using Web browsing behavior for
prediction of candidate preference, it is difficult to do better than
polls in absolute terms. However the accuracy of these models is at
least comparable, and since they use an entirely different source of
(passively collected) information for estimation they may be able
to avoid some of the bias that creeps into polling results.
5.3 Assessing an Exogenous Event
A significant promise of our method is the potential for fine-grained
analysis of user preference, potentially leading to insights about
how various factors influence the electorate. To illustrate this promise,
we consider the widely-discussed release of the so-called ‘Comey
letter’ on October 28, 2016: in early July 2016, FBI Director James
Comey stated that the FBI would not be bringing charges against
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton regarding an issue of her
handling of certain classified information while she was Secretary
of State. Then, on October 28, Director Comey announced that the
FBI was opening a review of new evidence in the case. This caused
immense controversy in the press, and many commentators (includ-
ing President Bill Clinton) attributed Donald Trump’s subsequent
victory to this ‘October surprise’ [41].
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Figure 7: Electorate preference surrounding the ‘Comey let-
ter’ (October 28) compared to previous weekly average.
To assess the impact of the ‘Comey letter’ we use our models to
make daily predictions of the preferences of the electorate in the
two weeks preceding Nov 4. As a comparison, we take the daily
average of predicted electorate preference over the six-week period
before October 28 (see Figure 4). The figure shows that during
the period October 28 to October 31, there was a dramatic and
statistically significant drop in Democratic preference across the
electorate. This shows how the temporal impact of such an event
can be assessed on a day to day basis.
Interestingly though, the figure also shows that Democratic pref-
erence was headed downward notably in advance of the release
of the ‘Comey letter.’ A significant drop in Democratic preference
appears starting around October 25. This suggests that the Comey
letter may have accelerated an effect that was already in progress.
Indeed, this analysis was puzzling in light of the narrative in the
popular press. However, as our paper was in final preparation, an
extensive and detailed study of the 2016 election polls was released
[28]. Quoting from that study (p. 22):
The evidence for a meaningful effect on the election
from the FBI letter is mixed at best. Based on Figure
6, it appears that Clinton’s support started to drop on
October 24th or 25th. October 28th falls at roughly
the midpoint (not the start) of the slide in Clinton’s
support.
We conclude that the fine-timescale analysis afforded by our
method adds nuance to the popular understanding of the ‘Comey
letter’ effect, while being strikingly in agreement with the most
recent detailed analysis based on polling data.
Augmenting this fine-timescale analysis, we can also look at the
‘Comey letter’ effect on a fine spatial scale. State-level analysis is
important because of the number of states, many midwestern, in
which predictions for a Clinton win based on polling turned out to
be incorrect.
Figure 8 shows the difference in preference for the Democratic
candidate before versus after the ‘Comey letter.’ Specifically, it
shows the average Democratic preference on Fri-Mon across the six
weeks prior to October 28, minus the average Democratic prefer-
ence on Fri-Mon subsequent to October 28. Due to the smaller sam-
ple sizes involved at the state level, individual state level differences
do not rise to the level of statistical significance, but nationwide
trends are nonetheless clear.
The figure shows that the popular shift away from Clinton was
stronger in the west and midwest of the country. In some cases, out-
liers can be understood as a result of small sample sizes (Wyoming,
Oklahoma, North Dakota). However, overall it is clear that there
were moves away from Clinton in some states with extremely close
margins - NH (.4%), MN (1.5%), AZ (3.9%), PA (1.2%), and thus the
‘Comey letter’ may have been a determinative factor in the election
as a whole.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented the first method that uses the his-
tory of user visits to Web sites to assess individual preference for
political candidates. In doing so we make a number of contribu-
tions. First, we pinpoint the challenges to be overcome in realizing
this goal, chief among them dealing with temporal and regional
heterogeity in user populations, as well as overcoming the lack of
individual-level ground truth labels for training. With respect to the
latter, we develop a new method allowing us to train a user-level
classifier using only aggregate (statewide polling) data. Second,
we show the power of using Web browsing behavior for assessing
candidate preference, particularly in terms of day-to-day and state-
to-state level predictions that elucidate the impact of exogenous
effects such as the ‘Comey letter.’
Our results suggest that access to browsing data gives consider-
able power to assess the preferences of the electorate. With respect
to understanding candidate preference, we believe that further use
of Web browsing data is likely to uncover additional insights about
the impact of campaign strategies, candidate speeches and visits,
and political ad campaigns. More broadly, we believe that the meth-
ods we present here are not fundamentally limited to studying
candidate preference and can be applied in a wide range of set-
tings in which we have access to consistent polling to train with,
including issue preference, attitudes, and identification.
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